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1. From the Sinn / Bedeutung distinction to the utterance meaning / 
linguistic meaning distinction: an instructional approach 
Two important distinctions historically shaped the contemporary conception of linguistic 
meaning: the first one, owed to Gottlob Frege’s work, differentiates meaning (Sinn) from 
denotation (Bedeutung), while the second one, essentially due to the work initiated by Émile 
Benvenniste, separates the semantic value of an utterance (usually called its sens, in French) 
from that of the linguistic form used for that utterance (its signification). In both cases, one of 
the important tasks that were undertaken was to explicate the complex relationship between 
the two concepts that were differentiated: the way Sinn and Beteutung are interrelated, and the 
way sens and signification are interconnected.  
The need to distinguish Sinn from Bedeutung stems from the possible differences between 
the speaker’s and the hearer’s knowledge and beliefs about how the world is: the now famous 
example of the morning star / evening star sentences illustrates this necessity. Even for a 
hearer who knows that the references of the two noun phrases are identical, the phrases are 
not interchangeable in all discourses; in particular, a speaker who says “Max does not know 
that the evening star is the same planet as the morning star” obviously does not say the same 
as “Max does not know that Venus is the same planet as Venus”… Many other pieces have 
been added to this ‘file’, from different perspectives, leading to the idea that reference, 
through natural language utterances, is only indirectly obtained, through what Frege called 
FIRST DRAFT 
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“die Art des Gegebenseins” (“the mode of presentation of the denoted object”, or « le mode de 
donation de l'objet [dénoté] »)1. Immediately after introducing this distinction, Frege 
introduces an additional distinction between Sinn, which is public and largely shared among a 
speaking community, and Vorstellung, which is private and, as Frege puts it, essentially 
subjective: 
Wenn die Bedeutung eines Zeichens ein sinnlich wahrnehmbarer Gegenstand ist, so ist 
meine Vorstellung davon ein aus Erinnerungen von Sinneseindrücken, die ich gehabt 
habe, und von Tätigkeiten, inneren sowohl wie äußeren, die ich ausgeübt habe, 
entstandenes inneres Bild (3). Dieses ist oft mit Gefühlen getränkt; […]. Nicht immer 
ist, auch bei demselben Menschen, dieselbe Vorstellung mit demselben Sinne 
verbunden. Die Vorstellung ist subjektiv: die Vorstellung des einen ist nicht die des 
anderen.2 
In this text, Frege takes for granted that, in contrast with Vorstellung3, Sinn can be “a 
common property of several individuals”, and excludes it from the “individual mode”, 
without any reason other than the authority argument which concludes the preceding 
paragraph: 
Die Vorstellung unterscheidet sich dadurch wesentlich von dem Sinne eines Zeichens, 
welcher gemeinsames Eigentum von vielen sein kann und also nicht Teil oder Modus 
der Einzelseele ist; denn man wird wohl nicht leugnen können, daß die Menschheit 
einen gemeinsamen Schatz von Gedanken hat, den sie von einem Geschlechte auf das 
andere überträgt4. 
Though there is no a priori reason to put in doubt the intuitions of such an important 
thinker, it seems that, oddly enough, Frege did not wonder how private representations, biased 
with all the subjectivity of the ‘individual mode’, could result in a perfectly objective 
common treasure which can be transmitted from generation to generation. I do not have, of 
course, the pretension to give an answer to that difficult question,  dramatically hidden by 
strongly rooted popular beliefs… I do offer a thread, however, to avoid that question while 
studying linguistic semantics: if this thread is strong enough, what ‘universalizes’ those 
‘private experiences’ is language itself, and there is no need to suppose that Sinn is objective 
in order to justify the study of the constraints human languages impose on it. What has to be 
objective is the set of those constraints; an important reason which forces to admit this 
objectivity is the fact that any idiot can acquire these constraints in less than 24 months, 
without any sort of training… 
Obviously, if I remove objectivity from Sinn, I am no longer entitled to call the result 
“Sinn”: fair enough, I suggest that we call the resulting concept “utterance meaning” (French: 
sens, Spanish: sentido, Italian: senso)5. Similarly, the set of constraints that any human being 
acquires so easily, though objective, and in spite of the fact that it can be seen as an Art des 
                                                
1 Frege (1892), p. 26 ; French translation : Imbert (1971), p. 102. 
2 Frege (1892), p. 29. The French translation (Imbert, 1971, p. 105) gives: « Si un signe dénote un objet perceptible au moyen 
des sens, ma représentation est un tableau intérieur, formé du souvenir des impressions sensibles et des actions externes ou 
internes auxquelles je me suis livré. Dans ce tableau, les sentiments pénètrent les représentations ; […]. Chez le même 
individu, la même représentation n'est pas toujours liée au même sens. Car la représentation est subjective ; celle de l'un n’est 
pas celle de l’autre. »  
3 Several dictionaries concord in giving: “idea”, “picture”, “imagination”, “representation”, “presentation”, “performance” 
for this German word, according to the context in which it is used. 
4 Frege (1892), p. 29. The French translation (Imbert, 1971, pp. 105-106) gives: « C'est par là qu'une représentation se 
distingue essentiellement du sens d'un signe. Celui-ci peut être la propriété commune de plusieurs individus : il n'est donc pas 
partie ou mode de l’âme individuelle. Car on ne pourra pas nier que l'humanité possède un trésor commun de pensées qui se 
transmet d’une génération à l'autre ». 
5 As far as I know, the first explicit presentation of the conceptual difference between utterance meaning and sentence 
meaning is due to Dascal (1983). 
 Gegebenseins (a way of ), cannot be called “Sinn” either, because it lacks the, so to speak, 
‘picturallity’ attached to the original concept: fair enough, again, I suggest that we call this set 
of constraints “sentence meaning”, “phrase meaning”, or else “linguistic meaning” (French: 
signification, Spanish: significado, Italian: significato). 
The notion of linguistic meaning is thus positioned somewhere between Sinn and 
signification; it relies on the observation that linguistic units (simple or complex) are partly 
(and only partly) responsible for the way their utterances are understood. In most of the work 
acknowledging both distinctions, that ‘responsibility’ is taken to be a set of instructions or 
constraints that each sign of a given human language imposes on the way one has to build the 
understanding of the utterances which contains it (its utterance meaning), out of what (s)he 
considers to be the relevant elements of the situation.  
Semantics can thus be conceived of as the discipline which empirically and scientifically 
studies the contribution of language units (simple or complex) to the construction of the 
meanings of their utterances in each situation. The contribution of the situations to the 
construction of utterance-meanings is studied, according to that conception, by pragmatics. 
We will see, in a few paragraphs, why this conception of semantics is to be preferred to the 
simple classical intuitive “science of meaning”: this paper can be seen as an exploration of 
several consequences of this conception of semantics. 
According to that conception of semantics, utterance-meaning is, clearly, the result of a 
construction achieved by some hearer, construction influenced by the linguistic meaning 
(sentence-meaning, phrase-meaning) of the language units used in the utterance and by the 








This pre-theoretic way of understanding the canvas of utterance-meaning construction 
belongs to the instructional semantics trend, as presented, for instance, in Harder (1990):  
“the emphasis is on meaning as something the speaker tells the addressee to do. If A (the 
addressee) does as he is told (follows the instructions), he will work out the 
interpretation that is the product of an act of communication”6.  
The conceptual distinction between utterance-meaning and sentence-meaning might look, 
at first glance, similar to Frege’s distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung, but that first glance 
similarity is incorrect: Frege did not have (or did not use) the distinction between utterance 
and sentence, and both his Sinn and his Bedeutung were attributed to language units though 
they were, in fact, aspects of utterance-meaning7. In contrast, from the instructional semantics 
                                                
6 Harder (1990), p. 41. 
7 If the reader had any doubt about this last point, (s)he might wonder how reference (Bedeutung) can be computed for a 
natural language sentence without it being uttered in a situation. When speaking of formal languages, it may be argued that 
utterance = <sentence , situation > 
utterance 
meaning sentence-meaning 
Diagram 1: contributions to utterance meaning  
point of view, utterance meaning is not attributed to language units, but is the result of an 
intellectual process and, as we will see shortly, in addition to be non objective, is anything but 
objectively observable. 
2. Proofs of the graduality of sentence meaning 
From that instructional conception of linguistic meaning, it follows that, even when a word 
or a phrase of a human language can be used in utterances understood as referring to a very 
precise entity (say, for instance, a geometrical object), the same word or phrase is necessarily 
also usable in utterances understood as vaguely referring to approximate entities (for instance, 
the approximate shape of that geometrical object). The proof goes in two steps.  
(i) Language units do not directly refer to entities outside language, but each of their use 
triggers a process at the end of which, in each situation, a reference may (or may not) be 
found; for each language unit, there must therefore be an undetermined number of 
possible external entities which could be reached by this process. Now, if each possible 
reference of a language unit X were precise (i.e. not approximate), the use of X could be 
understood only in situations where it could refer to an already planned external entity: 
this is, obviously, not the case, and, modus tollendo tollens, all possible references of a 
language unit is approximate. 
(ii) In some special purpose uses of language, when the discourse concerns rigorously 
defined entities, some language units may be such that there exists, within the domain of 
that use of language, exactly one rigorously defined entity which may constitute the 
reference of that special purpose use of language (the language unit is then a technical 
term). In the cases in which this language unit may also be used in non rigorously defined 
situations, the appropriateness of such a ‘derived’ use can be measured according to the 
proximity of the intended reference with respect to the rigorously defined case. For 
instance, the noun “rectangle”, when speaking of geometrical entities always refers to the 
same rigorously define entity. The same (?) word, “rectangle” happens to be also usable 
when speaking of, say, plastic pieces of a construction game; however, none of the plastic 
pieces, obviously, possesses the geometrical properties of what is referred to by 
“rectangle” in geometry: it is the proximity between the shape of the plastic piece and the 
geometrical rectangle that allows such a ‘derived’ use. Moreover, if the ‘derived’ use is 
acceptable when the shape of the plastic piece is ‘close’ to a geometrical rectangle, the 
less the shape meets the geometrical requirements, the less the use of “rectangle” to refer 
to it is understandable. Hence the necessary graduality of linguistic meaning. 
It is interesting to note that when a natural language expression has to be taken in a strictly 
non approximate sense, there must be non linguistic hints for the hearer to understand that the 
reference will be unique and rigorously defined: what ‘instructs’ the hearers to point to a 
precise entity, when they do, is taken from the situation, not from the linguistic meaning. 
The conceptual flavour of this proof might seem suspicious to several hearers/readers; 
moreover, it is valid under the assumption that the ‘instructional’ conception of meaning is 
adopted and the surprising nature of what is proven (call it P) under that assumption could be 
taken (in a sort of weakened modus tollendo tollens argument) as a reason to reject the 
assumption. However, it is easy to realize that, as a matter of fact, P is what empirically is the 
case: independently from the ‘instructional’ approach on which the conceptual proof rests, the 
example of the word “rectangle”, as we have seen, proves that at least one language unit 
which has a precise reference in rigorously defined situations, has an approximate reference in 
                                                                                                                                                   
all situations are considered equivalent: in that case, reference in one situation is the same in all situations, and it makes sense 
to speak of reference for the sentence itself. But this argument only works for formal languages and not for natural languages. 
non rigorously defined situations and that, moreover, the process which allows to reach that 
reference is gradual. It is easy (and clearly un necessary…) to test all of the English words 
that may refer, in some situations, to rigorously defined entities, and check that outside these 
situations, the reference of these English words is approximate and the process to reach it 
gradual. 
The ‘suspicious’ proof turns out, thus, to be welcome, and the ‘instructional’ conception of 
meaning resists this rejection attempt, which reinforces its credibility. 
3. Empiricity and scientificity of semantics 
This whole story would be a simple curiosity without an empirical scientific framework 
which accounted for this particularity, in addition to the other semantic facts that can be 
observed. In the sequel, I will sketch such a framework, taking inspiration from recent (and 
less recent) publications on the Semantics of Viewpoints. 
3.1. What are the observable phenomena of natural language semantics? 
In Raccah (2005), I showed that an essential scientificity requirement, valid for any kind of 
science, is that it should provide descriptions of a class of phenomena, in such a way that the 
descriptions of some of those phenomena provided de dicto explanations for the descriptions 
of other ones. I also pointed out that fulfilling empiricity requirements could not lead to 
believe that science describes the phenomena ‘the way they are’, since one cannot seriously 
believe that there is a possibility, for any human being, to know the way things are. Though 
scientific observers cannot prevail themselves of knowing how the world is, they have access 
to the world through their interpretation of the states of their sensorial apparatus. We also saw 
that that interpretation often relies on previously admitted scientific – or non scientific – 
theories. 
If we want to apply these requirements to semantic theories, we have to find observable 
semantic facts, which can be accessed to through our senses. It seems that we are faced with a 
big difficulty, which might force us to admit that there cannot be such a thing as an empirical 
semantic theory: semantic facts are not accessible to our sensorial apparatus. Even if we take 
into account the distinction between utterance-meaning and sentence-meaning, none of them 
is directly accessible to our senses. We are thus in a situation in which the very object about 
which we want to construct an empirical science prevents its study from being an empirical 
study… 
However, if we admit that physics is a good example of empirical sciences, we should 
realise that we are not in such a dramatic situation. For what the physicist can observe through 
her/his senses, say, the actual movements of the pendulum (s)he just built, is not what her/his 
theory is about (in that case, the virtual movements of any – existing or non existing – 
pendulum) the object of physical theories is not more directly accessible to the observers’ 
sensorial apparatus than the object of semantic theories. Physicists use different tricks in order 
to overcome that difficulty, one of which is the use of indirect observation: some directly 
observable8 objects or events are considered to be traces of non directly observable ones, 
which, in some cases, are seen as one of their causes, and, in other cases, as one of their 
effects. 
                                                
8 Though I have shown (ibid.) that nothing can be directly observable by a human being (since anything requires 
the interpretation of the state of our sensorial apparatus), I will use that expression to refer to objects or events 
whose access is granted by the interpretation of the effect they directly produce on our sensorial apparatus. This 
terminological sloppiness is introduced for the sake of legibility… 
If we are willing to keep considering physics as an empirical science, we are bound to 
consider that that indirect observation strategy is not misleading; we only have to see how it 
could be applied to the study of meaning. In order to illustrate how this could be done, I will 
examine an example and will abstract from it. 
Suppose an extra-terrestrial intelligence, ETI, wanted to study the semantics of English 
and, for that purpose, decided to observe speech situations. Suppose ETI hides in a room 
where several – supposedly English speaking – human beings are gathered, a classroom, for 
instance. Suppose now that ETI perceives that John pronounces “It is cold in here”. If all of 
ETI’s observations are of that kind, there is no chance that it can formulate grounded 
hypotheses about the meaning of the sequence it heard. For what can be perceived of John’s 
utterance is only a series of vibrations, which, in themselves, do not give cues of any kind as 
to what it can mean (except for those who understand English and interpret the utterance 
using their private know-how). If ETI wants to do its job correctly, it will have to use, in 
addition, observations of another kind. Intentional states are ruled out since they are not 
directly accessible to the observers’ sensorial apparatus. It follows that we will have to reject 
any statement of the kind: “the speaker meant so and so”, or “normally when someone says 
XYZ, he or she wants to convey this or that idea” or even “I, observer, interpret XYZ in such 
and such a way and therefore, that is the meaning of XYZ”. ETI will have to observe the 
audience’s behaviour and see whether, in that behaviour, it can find a plausible effect of 
John’s utterance: it will have to use indirect observation. The fact that it may be the case that 
no observable reaction followed John’s utterance does not constitute an objection to the 
indirect observation method: it would simply mean that ETI would have to plan other 
experiments. After all, even in physics, many experiments do not inform the theorists until 
they find the experimental constraints that work. 
Before we go further, it is useful to emphasise that we have just seen that the different 
‘popular learned conceptions’9 of semantics are wrong. Indeed, the observable phenomena of 
semantics (i) cannot be directly meanings, since these are not accessible to our sensorial 
apparatus; (ii) they are not just utterances, since that would not be enough to describe 
meaning phenomena; (iii) they are not pairs consisting of utterances and ‘intended meanings’, 
since such intentional things are not accessible to empirical observation. In our extra-
terrestrial example, we suggested that they are pairs consisting of utterances and behaviours. 
In the rest of this paper, I will take that suggestion as seriously as possible: in this section, I 
examine how to constrain the relationship between utterances and behaviours, and sketch 
some of the consequences of this choice. In particular, I show why (and in what sense) 
linguistic meaning is gradual. In the following sections, I present elements of a theoretical 
framework based on the conception of meaning that follows from that discussion. 
3.2. Three pre-theoretical hypotheses which characterise contemporary occidental 
rationality. 
 The causal attribution hypothesis 
Suppose that, in our example, ETI notices that, after John’s utterance, the following three 
actions take place: (i) Peter scratches his head, (ii) Paul closes the window and (iii) Mary 
writes something on a piece of paper. We all know (actually, we think we know, but we only 
believe…) that the correct answer to the question “what action was caused by John’s 
utterance?” is “Paul’s”. However, ETI has no grounds to know it and, in addition, it may be 
                                                
9 That is, the conception an educated person could have about semantics without having learnt and reflected 
about it previously… This is, it must be admitted, the conception held by many people who speak or write about 
language! 
the case that Paul closed the window not because of John’s utterance (which he may even not 
have heard), but because he was cold, or because there was too much noise outside to hear 
what John was saying… Obviously, the most plausible hypothesis, in normal situations, is the 
one according to which Paul’s action was caused by John’s utterance; but the fact that it is 
plausible does not make it cease to be a hypothesis… 
Thus, before ETI can continue its study, it must admit the following general hypothesis 
H0 Utterances may cause behaviours 
Moreover, in each experimental situation s, ETI must make specific hypotheses hS which 
particularise H0 in the situation s, and relate particular actions with the utterance under study. 
It is important to remind that H0 and the different hS are not facts about the world but 
hypotheses: they do not characterise the way things are but rather the way things are 
conceived of in our rationality. 
 The non materiality hypothesis 
Let us suppose that ETI shares with us the aspects of our contemporary occidental 
rationality expressed by H0. This would not prevent it from believing that the way John’s 
utterance caused Paul’s action is that the vibrations emitted by John during his utterance 
physically caused Paul to get up and close the window. Though it hurts our contemporary 
occidental rationality, this idea is not absurd: the fact that we simply cannot take it seriously 
does not make it false10. Moreover, utterances do have observable physical effects: a loud 
voice can hurt the hearers’ ears, specific frequencies can break crystal, etc. What our 
rationality cannot accept is the idea that the linguistic effects of the utterances could be 
reduced to material causality. In order to rule out this idea, we need another hypothesis, which 
is also characteristic of our rationality rather than of the state of the world: 
H1 The linguistic effects of an utterance are not due to material causes 
As a consequence of H1, if we cannot believe that the observable actions caused by an 
utterance are due to its materiality, we are bound to admit that they are due to its form. In our 
rationality, the causal attribution requested by H0 is constrained to be a formal causality. 
 The non immediateness hypothesis 
If we use the term sentence to refer to a category of form of utterances, we start to be in the 
position to fill the gap between what we can observe (utterances and behaviours) and what we 
want semantics to talk about (sentences and meanings). However, there is yet another option 
that our rationality compels us to rule out: ETI could accept H1 and believe that though the 
causality that links John’s utterance to Paul’s action is not material, it directly determined 
Paul’s action. That is, one could believe that John’s utterance directly caused Paul to close the 
window, without leaving him room for a choice. This sort of belief corresponds to what we 
can call a ‘magic thinking’; indeed, in Ali Baba’s tail, for instance, there would be no magic if 
the “sesame” formula were recognised by a captor which would send an “open” instruction to 
a mechanism conceived in such a way that it could open the cave. The magical effect is due to 
the directedness of the effect of the formula. It is interesting to note that this feature of our 
rationality, which compels us to reject direct causality of forms, is rather recent and not 
completely ‘installed’ in our cognitive systems: there are many traces in human behaviour and 
in human languages of the ‘magic thinking’. From some uses of expressions like “Please” or 
“Excuse me” to greetings such as “Happy new year!”, an impressing series of linguistic 
expressions and social behaviours suggests that, though a part of our mind has abandoned the 
                                                
10 Some Buddhist sects seek the “language of nature” in which the words emit the exact vibrations which 
correspond to the objects they refer to… 
‘magic thinking’, another part still lives with it. Think, for instance, about the effects of 
insults on normal contemporary human beings… 
However, for scientific purposes, we definitely abandoned the ‘magic thinking’ and, again, 
since it is a characteristic of our rationality and not a matter of knowledge about the world, no 
observation can prove that it has to be abandoned: we need another hypothesis, which could 
be stated as follows: 
H2 The directly observable effects of utterances are not directly caused by them 
The acceptance of that “anti-magic” hypothesis has at least two types of consequences on the 
conception one can have of human being.  
The first type of consequences pertains to ethics: if utterances do not directly cause 
observable effects on human actions, no human being can justify a reprehensible action 
arguing that they have been told or even ordered to accomplish them. If a war criminal tries to 
do so, he or she will give the justified impression that he or she is not behaving like a human 
being, but rather like a kind of animal or robot. As human beings, we are supposed to be 
responsible for our actions; which does not mean that we are free, since a reprehensible 
decision could be the only way of serving vital interests. Though this type of consequences of 
H2 are serious and important, they do not directly belong to the subject matter of this paper 
and we will have to end the discussion here. However, we think they were worth 
mentioning… 
The second type of consequences of H2 concern the relationship between semantics and 
cognitive science. Indeed, H2, combined with H0 and H1, can be seen as a way of setting the 
foundations of a science of human cognition and of picturing its relationship with related 
disciplines. If we admit, in agreement with H0, H1 and H2, that an utterance indirectly and non 
materially causes an action, we are bound to accept the existence of a non physical causal 
chain linking the utterance to the action, part of that chain being inaccessible to our sensorial 
apparatus. The object of semantics is the first link of the chain; the first internal state can be 
seen as the utterance meaning. The action is determined by a causal lattice in which the 
utterance meaning is a part, and which includes many other elements and links; none of these 
elements or links are directly observable, though indirect observation can suggest more or less 
plausible hypotheses about them. Different theoretical frameworks in cognitive science 
construe that causal lattice in different ways; they also use the variations of different 
observable parameters in order to form these hypotheses. In our example, the only two 
directly observable parameters were utterances and actions, for the part of the lattice that we 
are interested in is the chain that links utterances to actions. However, other kinds of cognitive 
science experiments could be interested in studying the variations of other directly observable 
parameters, such as electrical excitation, visual input, outside temperature, etc. for the 
beginning of the chain and movement characteristics, body temperature, attention, etc. for the 
end of the chain11. 
The fact that cognitive science and semantics may share experimental devices is not 
sufficient to suggest that there can be a “cognitive semantics”: the object of semantics (the 
link between utterances and utterance meanings) does not belong to the causal lattice which 
constitutes the object of cognitive science. 
                                                
11 I obviously didn’t choose realistic nor very interesting parameters… but my purpose is only illustrative. 
4. Why constraints on argumentation ought to be specifically accounted 
for in a scientific empirical theory of sentence meaning 
We now have elements to answer the question: under what conditions the semantics of 
human languages could be an empirical science? We have seen that, in order to describe its 
object of study, sentence meaning, it is necessary to observe accessible traces of utterance 
meanings, and abstract from these observations: the sentence meaning descriptions have to 
account for what is invariant in the utterance meanings across the different situations. More 
precisely, if all the utterances of a sentence S share some property P whose accessible traces 
can be observed in the reactions of the audience in the different utterance situations, the 
semantic description of S must include a property P’, which is responsible for the property P 
in all the situations. Without that constraint, there is no guarantee that the semantic 
description of S is (i) based on empirical observation and (ii) valid for S itself and not only for 
some utterances of S.  
4.1. Why constraints on argumentation ought to be accounted for 
Keeping that in mind, semantics cannot limit itself do describing the informational aspects 
of meaning: several non-informational properties of utterances do not depend on situations 
and if they were not described within a semantic theory, they would be simply forgotten… 
One of these properties concerns argumentation. It is not difficult to observe that, though not 
all utterances are argumentations, any sentence, whatsoever, can be uttered in a situation in 
which that utterance is an argumentation. Thus, for instance, though it is true that if someone 
utters “It is 8 o’clock” as an answer to the question “What time is it”, he/she is normally not 
making an argumentation; however, the very same sentence “It is 8 o’clock” can be uttered in 
a situation in which the speaker is trying to have the addressee hurry up… Obviously, 
sentences cannot determine the argumentative orientations of their possible utterances (be it 
only because some of those utterances do not have argumentative orientation while other ones 
do…). Nevertheless, they must impose constraints on argumentativity since, otherwise, any 
sentence could be use for any argumentative purpose: and this is not the case. For instance, “It 
is only 8 o’clock” cannot serve the argumentative orientation it is late. 
The fact that absolutely all sentences can be used in an argumentative utterance requires 
that an empirical semantic framework for human languages be able to account for the 
constraints sentences impose on argumentation. In the following sections, we will show that 
these constraints cannot be derived from truth-conditions or other ‘informational’ 
frameworks; we will then introduce the Theory of Argumentation within Language and 
present its aims and functioning. We will finally go back to the relationship between 
semantics and cognition and discuss the interest of that approach for cognitive research. 
4.2. Why specifically 
The leading trend in linguistic semantics identifies meaning with information. From 
Montague to Chomsky, from Situation Semantics to Discourse Representation "theory", the 
models change but not the fundamental assumptions. According to those assumptions, the 
meaning of a natural language sentence is a state of the world. This point of view specifies the 
notion of information which is equated with meaning: it is not the Shanonian concept of noise 
reduction –since this concept could not be identified with the notion of state of the world–, 
but rather the logical-conceptual notion of truth-conditions, which we have seen above, in 
connection with the conceptual organisation of scientific knowledge. The different models in 
that classical trend mainly differ in their conception of how the meanings of parts of discourse 
assemble to form the sentence's truth conditions (or, equivalently, the information conveyed 
by the sentence). 
I will now very briefly show that natural languages differ from logical reconstruction 
systems in (at least) three essential points12. 
a) The role of the utterer 
Natural language utterances have a single, individual utterer who takes the responsibility for 
them, while logical languages utterances have a universally quantified utterer. Understanding 
a natural language utterance involves a characterization of its utterer. Utterances of the Italian 
sentence: 
 il cane è ancora sul tappeto 
can be understood only by someone who understands the relationship between the utterer and 
the dog (it is still vs. another time on the carpet) 
b) The concept of truth 
(1) the concept of truth, which is central in logical reconstruction languages is only useful 
in natural languages;  
Example 
The meaning of 
The dog is on the carpet 
is certainly different from the meaning of 
The carpet is under the dog 
however, the two sentences have exactly the same truth conditions. 
Moreover, 
(2) when the concept of truth is used, it is not the same concept as the one central to 
logical languages. 
Indeed, the concept of truth in logical languages is opposed to that of falsity, while, in 
natural languages, it is opposed to that of lie. 
It is easy to find falsities that are not lies, as well as lies that are not falsities. 
Example 
- "I live in Bologna", said at a conference in Sydney to a Japanese participant by someone 
who lives in Casalecchio (a small town which touches Bologna), would be false (since 
Casalecchio is different from Bologna and is not included in it), but would not be a lie (it 
would probably be the best way to have the hearer understand where the speaker lives). 
- "No, I don't have cigarettes" said by someone who only has cigarillos to a beggar who 
asked for a cigarette, would be true (since a cigarillo is not a cigarette), but would 
certainly be a kind of lie (since one can expect the beggar to be at least equally pleased 
with a cigarillo...). 
c) Variability vs. stability of meaning across occurrences 
It is essential for logical reconstruction languages that each term of the language be 
associated with one and only one meaning13. This is, among other, to insure that, whenever 
the same term occurs several time in the same utterance, it refers to the same concept. In 
natural languages, the 'rule' is exactly the opposite: whenever the same word occurs several 
times in the same utterance, it must be assigned different meanings. 
Example (inspired from Oswald Ducrot's seminar) 
                                                
12 These points of difference are, actually, connected and the distinction I make is only for exposition purpose. 
13 This is also true for the meaning of variables: their value assignation does vary according to the context of their 
occurrence, but not the way in which that assignation is computed. 
In Racine's Andromaque, Pyrrhus protects Andromaque's child against the Greeks because 
he wants her to marry him. The Greeks badly threaten Pyrrhus and Andromaque doesn't 
seem to accept Pyrrhus' proposition. At that point, Pyrrhus says to Andromaque: 
Je meurs si je vous perds, mais je meurs si j'attends14 
In that utterance, the two occurrences of I die cannot be interpreted with the same meaning, 
because of the presence of but (which imposes both an opposition between some 
consequences of the two 'types of death' and a sort of ranking of those two deaths...). Such 
a construction is impossible in formal languages (no connectives or operators allow such a 
differentiation in the interpretation) and would be ridiculous in a 'semi-formal' technical 
sub-language. Consider, for instance, the following sentence: 
* The positive square root of X is even if X is multiple of 4,  
but the positive square root of X is even if X is even. 
4.3. Language and topical organization of its argumentative structure 
From the 'logicist' point of view, since meaning is information (more specifically, truth-
conditions), all the effects of an utterance must be derived from the information it conveys 
and the situation of the utterance. Thus, if two utterances convey the same information in the 
same situation, the logicist position predicts that all the semantic effects of those two 
utterances would be identical; in particular, they should –necessarily– have the same 
argumentative orientation. This prediction is contrary to the observable data. Among the 
extremely numerous examples, let us consider the following pair of sentences: 
John is clever, but he is clumsy 
John is clumsy, but he is clever 
uttered by two members of the same hiring commission, while considering John Smith's 
application. 
The argumentative orientations of the two utterances are clearly opposed, while in this 
single situation, the information they convey is the same (in the sense of truth-conditional, 
objective information)15. 
A careful examination shows that examples of this kind, far from being exceptions, are 
central in natural languages, and not only when connectives are used16. If we consider these 
facts as relevant for language description, we have to provide, within the semantic 
description, an independent treatment of argumentation. 
Once we have reached this point, three positions can be argued (the fourth one –the logicist 
position–, has already been eliminated): 
a) the minimalist position: 
According to this position, not all utterances have argumentational effects and, thus, the 
necessity of directly accounting for argumentational phenomena within semantics only 
concerns a few number of words and constructions of natural languages. The informational 
effects are central, while the argumentational ones are peripheral. 
b) the centralist position 
According to this position, all words and constructions of all natural languages need an 
argumentational description, even when they occur in utterances that are not explicitly 
                                                
14 "I die if I loose you, but I die if I wait". 
15 As an evidence for that, note that none of the two commission members would hold that the other is mistaken about the 
state of the word, or lied, or simply uttered a false statement. 
16 A host of examples such as "John is intelligent" vs "John is cunning" can be found to illustrate this point. 
used in an argumentation. An informational description may also be needed, but it is never 
enough to exhaust the semantic description. 
c) the maximalist position 
According to this position, the necessity of directly accounting for informational 
phenomena within semantics only concerns a few number of words and constructions of 
natural languages. The argumentational effects are central, while the informational ones 
are peripheral. 
As we have seen, position a) is unacceptable. It would be too optimistic to seek a general 
proof of the accurateness of position b) or position c); however, for each alleged counter-
example provided by the tenants of the minimalist position, there has been –up to now– a way 
of proving either that it was not a natural utterance or that it needed an argumentational 
description. On the other hand, there are still examples that the tenants of the maximalist 
position consider as relevant facts though the description of their informational aspects cannot 
–for the time being– be derived from that of their agumentational aspects17. 
In order to describe the argumentative inferences involved in the semantics of natural 
languages, one must have made a decision concerning the following problem. 
Consider the following argumentations: 
a) The weather was cold last night: the plants must be in a bad shape 
b) There has been frost last night: the plants must be dead 
c) The weather was mild last night: the plants must be in a good shape 
One can either take the standpoint that each of these utterances rely on a different 
argumentative warrant: 
a. When the weather is cold the plants generally suffer 
b. When the weather is chilling, the plants generally die 
c. When the weather is mild, the plants generally go well 
or else consider that all of these argumentations rely on one and the same rule relating the 
weather to the health of the plants. 
From the latter point of view, which is the one I adopt, since this rule is to be applied to all 
of the possible argumentations differing from one another only by the intensity, it must be 
gradual. In the case under study, it would be of the form: 
 The better the weather, the better the health of the plants 
or The worse the weather, the worse the health of the plants 
Gradual rules of this kind are categories of warrants; they are called topoi (singular: topos) 
and have been studied within the framework of the theory of Argumentation within Language. 
The description of natural language operators and connectives is extremely facilitated by the 
use of topoi18. 
It turned out that the description of lexicon also needed topoi19. If, for instance, we want to 
describe the meaning of the word rich only using an informational (truth-conditional) 
description, we cannot account for the odd effect of 
                                                
17 Consider, for instance, the opposition between "John has finished" and "John has almost finished". The informational 
difference between utterances of those two sentences cannot be accounted for in terms of argumentative orientation, since it 
remains even in thu cases in which they have the same orientation.  
18 See, for instance, Raccah (1987) for a description of but; or Bruxelles and Raccah (1987) for a description of the French 
si...alors (if...then). 
19 See Raccah (1987) or Bruxelles et al. (1995) for a more detailed discussion. 
This baby is rich 
Again, one can think that the oddness of the utterances of that sentence is only a marginal 
phenomenon. In that case, one should not bother trying to describe the word “rich” in such a 
way that this oddness could be predicted. But if one considers, as I do, phenomena of this 
kind as central for natural languages, it becomes necessary to deal with that question.  
Using the topoi, the oddness of the utterances of the sentence above can be predicted. The 
descriptive apparatus needs to assign lexical topical fields to words20. In particular, the word 
rich is assigned the topical field 
<POSSESSION, power> 
That is, the word rich triggers an instruction such as: <see possession as a source of 
power!>21.  
5. From argumentation to points of view 
Since the argumentative orientation of an utterance is part of its utterance meaning, we 
may understand that that an argumentative orientation is a point of view defended by the 
utterance. 
At this point, it is useful to distinguish between 
1. Points of view that result from the interpretation of an utterance 
and 
2. Points of view that must be met in order to understand an utterance. 
The first kind of point of view are attributed to the speaker and may be questioned by the 
hearer, while points of view of the second kind are presented as shared by the speaker and the 
hearer (for that reason, they are sometimes called “argumentative presupposition”); they 
reveal the ideology within which the speaker rests. 
A well known example illustrates the distinction. Consider an utterance of the sentence 
(1) John is a republican but he is honest 
- in a situation in which speaker and hearer wonder whether they can trust John for some 
particular matter. An utterance of (1) clearly defends a positive point of view about trusting 
John, though, in order to understand it, one must admit –at least for a second– that 
republicans should not be trusted in general. This effect is due to the specific constraint on 
interpretation imposed by “but”, according to which the two members of the utterance 
must defend opposite points of view; given that “honest” indicates, in any situation, a 
positive point of view regarding trust, it is not possible to understand utterances of (1) 
without building a negative point of view as to whether republicans should be trusted. In 
order to better understand the strength of the semantic constraint imposed by “but”, it is 
useful to examine an example where normal hearers have real cognitive difficulties 
adopting points of view which fulfil the constraints imposed by “but”.22 Consider an 
utterance of the sentence 
(2) It is raining but I have to finish my work 
in a situation in which it is an answer to an offer to go out for a walk. The first impression 
given by utterances of (2), in situations of the kind envisaged, is that the speaker made a 
                                                
20 See next session for more details on topoi and topical fields. 
21 Note that these instructions are language dependent (and even community dependent –cf. the difference between the 
English rich and the Spanish rico–). 
22 We are not trying to suggest that republicans are objectively generally dishonest: the example would work the same with 
democrats or ecologists… What is suggested is that it is cognitively easy to imagine that the speaker supposes that the hearer 
shares that point of view with him/her. 
mistake or that there is something wrong somewhere. If an observer is urged to understand the 
utterance as it is, she/he might eventually imagine that both the speaker and the hearer are 
members of some ‘rain lovers’ club, and there will be no interpretation problem… The 
cognitive effort is heavy23, but such a far-fetched hypothesis is the only way to build an 
interpretation for the utterance; this shows the strength of the semantic constraint imposed by 
“but”. 
5.1. Describing argumentative constraints 
We have seen that semantics must describe the constraints that linguistic units impose on 
points of view, and we saw that it must distinguish between constraints suggested and 
constraint imposed (or presupposed24). It is now time to show that this can be done… 
We will first examine some properties of a few special cases which will be used for the 
description of the general case. After showing how these properties can be extended to the 
general case, we will sketch the basic elements of the technical apparatus, leaving the details 
for technical reports. 
5.1.1. Special cases 
Articulators 
Some of the constraints on points of view are imposed by articulators (i.e. connectives like 
“but” and operators like “even” or “little”). They are language-specific and can be very 
different from one human language to the other. We saw, in the last section, the two 
constraints “but” imposes on points of view: they concern the articulation between the points 
of view that the utterance can have the hearer construct. 
Euphorical / Dysphorical words 
Some words impose positive (resp. negative) judgements wherever they are used, and 
whoever uses them. Words like “interesting” or “honest” (that we saw in the last section), 
impose a positive judgement even if used by a boring or a dishonest speaker; words like 
“stupid” impose a negative judgement even when used by non-intelligent speakers. 
Combining the constraints of the articulators with the euphorical / dysphorical properties 
allows an observer to compute the ideological force of other words in an utterance. The 
ideological force, computed in that manner, may vary, for the same word, from an utterance 
to the other 
John is a republican but he is honest 
John is a republican but he is dishonest 
It follows from that last observation that ideological forces computed in that way cannot, 
generally, be attributed to the words of the language and do not belong to the semantic 
description. As we will see in the next section, in order to be entitled to consider an 
ideological feature as a possible candidate for the semantic description of a linguistic unit, 
pairs like the one above should show one (and only one) problematic utterance. 
5.1.2. General case 
Other words impose more sophisticated judgements which are encoded as in a micro-
programme provided by the human language which they belong to. Here the diversity across 
languages is even stronger than for the articulators. Those micro-programmes, attached to the 
                                                
23 Surely heavier than to imagine that republicans are not, in general, honest… 
24 The term “presupposed” is used by analogy with logical presupposition: the phenomenon described here shares properties 
with classical presupposition but cannot be identified with classical presupposition (the first essential reason is that one 
concerns truth values while the other one does not concern truth at all). 
words, require accepting the influence of specific points of view on some entities onto the 
points of view from which one will consider some other entities. For instance, the word 
“lavorare”, in Italian requires that the activity referred to be considered from the point of view 
of tiredness25 
As an illustration, we will examine a few examples concerning the word “rich”. We will let 
the reader appreciate, in (5)-(8), whether the utterances marked as problematic do suppose 
specific hypotheses on the situation.26 
John is rich: he has a lot of power 
?? John is rich: he has very little power 
?? John is rich but he has a lot of power 
John is rich but he has very little power 
These pairs of examples suggest that the set of constraints which describes the word “rich” 
should include seeing possession as source of power. A last example concerning the semantic 
description of “rich” is an apparent curiosity, which becomes highly predictable as soon as 
one seriously envisages that the constraints which the words of a human language impose are 
not constraints on denotation, but rather constraints on points of view. 
?? This baby is rich 
This baby just inherited a huge fortune 
Though the logical proposition one can associate with (10) implies the logical proposition one 
can associate with (9), utterances of (9) are problematic, while utterances of (10) are not. The 
explanation of this otherwise puzzling fact is the conflict between the points of view on power 
suggested by “baby” with the point of view on power suggested by “rich”. 
5.2. More about topical fields 
As a result of what has been said, the main idea which guides acceptable theoretical 
models for the semantics of human languages is that sentences do not merely convey 
information, but also give conventional indications on how this information is seen by the 
speaker. In this section, I present the characteristic features of one of these acceptable models: 
the concepts related to topical fields. 
The concept of topical field is used to represent these conventional indications on points of 
view. Thus, if we accept that information can be represented as conceptual fields, a topical 
field can be seen as a point of view on some information, that is, as a valuation of a 
conceptual field. We can thus represent topical fields as ordered pairs <CONCEPTUAL FIELD, 
valuation principle>, where the valuation principle can be either a judgment (in that case, we 
have an elementary topical field), or another topical field (in that case, we have a compounded 
topical field)27. A more formal definition is the following: 
i. Elementary topical field: 
An ordered pair <CF,val> is an elementary topical field if and only if: 
CF is a conceptual field, and 
                                                
25 See Bruxelles and al. (1995) for more details on the description of that word. 
26 It is reminded that, in semantic examples, nothing syntactically correct can be considered ‘impossible’ or ‘non 
interpretable’: an utterance is problematic if specific hypotheses concerning the situation it refers to or the situation in which 
it must be interpreted are necessary in order for the utterance to be understandable. Such utterances are understood thanks to 
some knowledge of the situation, while non problematic utterances need only knowledge of the language to be understood. 
Another way to put it is that the contribution of language to the interpretation of problematic utterances is insufficient, while 
the contribution of the situation the interpretation of non-problematic utterances is insignificant. 
27 See Raccah (1990) for an introduction to topical fields in connection with the Theory of Argumentation Within Language; 
see Raccah (2010) for an application to the ViewPoint Semantics. 
Val is a member of the simple evaluation set {good,bad} 
ii. General recursive definition 
An ordered pair <CF,TF> is a non-elementary topical field if  
CF is a conceptual field, and 
TF is either an elementary topical field or a non-elementary topical field 
iii. Closure 
X is a topical field if and only if it is  
either an elementary topical field  
or a non-elementary topical field 
As expected, a topical field, considered to be a way of seeing a conceptual field, may also 
serve as a valuation principle for other topical fields. Simple valuations (good / bad) on 
conceptual fields, regardless of there being a justification for them, lead to elementary topical 
fields.  
5.3. Topoi 
A topos is a category of warrants of argumentation. Keeping in mind that an argumentation 
presents itself as inducing a point of view, we can see a topos as relating two topical fields in 
such a way that the points of view represented by the first topical field (antecedent) influence 
the points of view represented by the second one (consequent). The general form of a topos is 
thus 
//the more (the less) P, the more (the less) Q// 
where P and Q are topical fields. 
Depending on the degree of integration of the topoi in the culture of a linguistic 
community, three kinds of topoi must be distinguished: 
• Dynamic topoi: they are evoked by utterances or discourses, in their situations of 
interpretation. 
• Cultural topoi: they may be evoked by –not very original– utterances or discourses, and are 
shared by a linguistic community. 
• Lexical topoi: they may be evoked by –doxical– utterances or discourses and are shared by 
a linguistic community, and are ‘crystallised’ in the words of the natural language spoken 
within that community. 
Present research in lexical semantics, within the framework explicated above, aims at 
building and applying contrastive linguistic tests which can rigorously exhibit the status of the 
topoi evoked by utterances28. This technical phase is useful and necessary in order to 
accurately and systematically provide lexical descriptions which include all and only the topoi 
which are crystallized in the words of the different languages taken into consideration. A ‘by-
product’ of this research direction is the specification of the cultural differences encoded in 
the different human languages analysed (this will allow, for instance, to better understand 
how –and what of– culture, beliefs, ideology are crystallized –or ‘encapsulated’– in the words 
of a language. In particular, research on the relationship between lexical description and the 
semantics of proverbs29 and/or idiomatic expressions30 is in progress. Another ‘by-product’ 
(in a long-term prevision…) is the realisation of multi-lingual dictionaries of the ideologies 
crystallised in the different linguistic communities, based on the systematic topical description 
of the lexical entries of different natural languages. 
                                                
28 See, for instance, Chmelik (2005) for a description of one test and for its application. 
29 See, BenMahfoudh-Hubert (2005). 
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